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Britain arming Suharto 
First there was the Green Rover, a replenishment ship for the Indonesian navy. Next, the Bandung 
aerospace symposium, a meeting of military manufacturing minds. Soon, the British arms industry will 
play its trump card: the sale of 40 Hawk fighters to Indonesia. This £600m deal explains a lot about 
the British governments present behaviour. 
British Aerospace will supply the Indonesian airforce with 
up to 40 Hawk fighter-trainers in a deal to be completed 
over the next two months. Last year, the company signed a 
memorandum of understanding with IPTN, Indonesia's state 
aerospace company, for production of Hawk fighter-trainer 
aircraft. The year-long negotiations are now in their closing 
stages, 9 months after the Indonesian army's vivid display 
of brutality at Santa Cruz in East Timor. 
The sale of forty Hawk fighter-trainer aircraft will not be 
the first Hawks that British Aerospace has sold to Indo-
nesia: 13 were sold between 1978 and 1981. Other major 
deals include £340m worth of Rapier air defence missiles 
and £3m for a technology college in East Java. British 
Aerospace has turned Britain into Indonesia's second 
biggest arms supplier. Meanwhile, growing demand from 
Acehnese refugees demand 
UNHCR protection 
A group of 43 Acehnese men, women and children went 
into the UN High Commission for Refugees office in Kuala 
Lumpur on 22 June and refused to leave, demanding 
political refugee status to protect them from being forcibly 
returned to Indonesia. As we went to press, the group had 
spent more than a month in the UNHCR compound and 
still refuse to leave. 
This act of desperation highlights the fear among 
Acehnese, so many of whom face imminent danger of 
refoulement (repatriation against their will) to Indonesia 
which could mean death, torture or imprisonment. [For the 
background, please see TAPOL Bulletin, No 111, June 
1992.] 
They ·entered the UNHCR premises one week before 
expiry of a Malaysian government ultimatum requiring all 
'illegal immigrants' to register with the authorities by 30 
June or face arrest and deportation. Almost all are from 
Indonesia. Whatever the reasons for the ultimatum as far as 
continued on page 20 
this regional military power has favoured other military 
manufacturers in Britain. The BAe agreement will provide 
Rolls Royce with its biggest yet deal with Indonesia, to 
supply the jet-engines. "Indonesia is a very exciting part of 
the world", said Rod Williams, a company representative. 
So it is. 
Hypocrisy 
At around the time of the BAe/IPTN memorandum, in June 
1991, the European Community's Council of Ministers 
adopted a Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Arms 
Exports, specifying 8 criteria for national arms export 
policies, including respect for human rights and interna-
tional law in the country ·Of final destination. Indonesia's 
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occupation of East Timor aJone should have rendered it 
unacceptable. Not so, according to Britain. From 1986 and 
1991 it sold £522m worth of advance weapons systems to 
Indonesia and clearly intends to expand its position in the 
Indonesian market. 
In August 1991 Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd urged the 
European Commission to cut aid to countries that violate 
human rights [Sunday Times, 18.VIII.91]. Two weeks after 
the Santa Cruz massacre, the European Council of Ministers 
adopted a Declaration linking human rights to relations with 
developing countries. Britain's response to the massacre was 
consistent with neither of these positions. While Canada, 
Denmark and HoJJand suspended aid, Britain quietly 
admonished the Indonesian ambassador in London. Three 
month's later, the sale to Indonesia of a refurbished ex-
Royal Navy support ship, the Green Rover, was announced. 
The announcement had been discreetly po~tponed because 
of the massacre. 
The government defends the Hawks deal by insisting that 
the aircraft are 'fighter-trainers' only, and not suitable for 
repression or for operations in East Timor. What the 
government ignores, however, is that the aircraft are easily 
convertible to fighters as was established with the first 
batch. Indonesia is understood to have been swayed in the 
negotiations by the promise of "technology transfer" 
[Guardian, 26.Vl.92). Both British Aerospace and Rolls 
Royce will find the Bandung aerospace symposium next 
October very useful [TAPOL Bulletin, No. 111). 
To argue that arms sold to Indonesia have no direct use in 
East Timor or Aceh or West Papua is both untrue and 
deceitful. First, we now have photographic evidence that 
Land Rovers are used by the army of occupation in East 
A British IAnd Rover in East Tunor, with Indonesian combat troops 
carrying Ml6 automatic rifles (photo by Stephan Schoor, taken in 
August 1991). 
Timor. But more generally, any supplies to the Indonesian 
armed signals support for its barbaric practices. 
Hot on the heels of the BAe deal came the news that UK 
aerospace company, Lucas Industries has won a joint 
contract with a German computer company to supply up to 
£350m of flight control systems to IPTN. 
The promotion of British goods is a skilled art, especiaJly 
in a recession. That IPTN is a state-owned company only 
underscores the point. The conclusion must surely be that 
these deals are the factors determining Britain's hypocritical 
and obstructionist stance on relations with Indonesia. * 
Indonesian officers to train in Britain 
Documents containing details of Indonesian army officers who will come to the UK this year for 
training have come into our possession. The British government persistently refuses to give information 
about military training programmes. After years of secrecy, the documents make interesting reading. 
The details are contained in application forms and support-
ing papers for three army officers who will take courses at 
universities or academies with costs borne by the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office Scholarships and Awards 
Scheme and the UK Military Training Assistance Scheme. 
Of particular interest is the comment made on each appli-
cation form by an official of the British Embassy in Jakarta, 
explaining how the candidate meets FCO SAS criteria: 
"The candidate is proposed With the full support of the 
Embassy's Defence Attache. It has previously been agreed 
wi.th the CRD {?] tha.t the position of the Armed Forces in 
Indonesian society is such that its members are important 
decision-makers and opinion-formers and do, therefore 
fall within the scope of FCO SAS. Up to 40% of the 
participants in Indonesia '.S' political fora are drawn from the 
Armed Forces and they are a target for support under the 
FCO Schemes in Indonesia. " 
In one application form, the question: "Are there any 
potential commercial interests in this award?", has the 
following reply by Embassy official: 
"The Government of Indonesia is looking increasingly to 
Britain and to the British model in the development of its 
approach... [a few words are missing from this apparently 
standard comment; the text continues] ... equipment orienta-
tion in his career to date and in future will hold posts 
directly concerned with . equipment management and 
procurement. Britain does well, therefore, to be the pro-
vider of training at an influential stage of the candidate'.S' 
career development. " 
The close connection between the training and Britain's 
desire to invest in future association with men likely to hold 
key state positions and the promotion of British exports to 
the Indonesian armed forces could hardly be made plainer. 
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Replying to questions from Lord Avebury about the three 
army trainees, Baroness Chalker, the Minister for Overseas 
Development, · was unable to contest the details about the 
men. Asked for details about UKMTAS, she said: "A total 
of £14.7 million is available under UKMTAS worldwide in 
this financial year. The allocation of funds to individual 
countries varies from year to year and is not made public, 
and details of the training courses paid for under UKMT AS 
are not normally disclosed." [Emphasis added.] 
She also revealed in response to questions from Lord 
Avebury that the FCO SAS had met the costs of training 
for five officers from Indonesia in 1991-92 and is expected 
to pay for seven officers to attend courses in 1992-93. 
Details about three of these officers are now known. One 
is Minulyo Suprapto who applied for a course at the Royal 
Military College of Science in Cranfield will, according to 
Baroness Chalker, take an MSc course in information 
technology at the Institute of Technology in Cranfield. 
Since 1987, Minulyo has been a Rapier missile technician; 
Rapier missiles worth more than £300m were sold to 
Indonesia by Britain Aerospace in the 1980s. He twice 
attended British Aerospace courses at Stevenage - in 1987 
and 1988. He states in his application form that his pre-
ferred fields of study with the UK scholarship are 'military 
vehicle technology' and 'gun system design'. 
Kustanto Widiatmoko has, since 1987, been an armour 
platoon leader in the First Armour Squadron of the Presi-
dential Security Service. He will take a masters degree 
course in Defence Administration at the Royal Military 
College of Science at Shrivenham. 
Akhmad Buldan was communication platoon leader with 
an infantry battalion from 1983 to 1986, since when he has 
been a field-communication sub-detachment leader. 
Although he applied for a place at the Royal Military 
College of Science in Shrivenham, Baroness Chalker told 
Lord Avebury he would take a masters course in informa-
tion technology at Nottingham University. 
Commons motion 
After learning of these scholarships, members of Parliament 
tabled an Early Day Motion regretting the scholarships for 
the three men and, in the light of the recent massacre at 
Santa Cruz, urging the government to cancel the scheme 
targetted at supporting the Indonesian armed forces imme-
diately, until those responsible are brought to justice. In less 
than ten days, more than 40 MPs had signed the motion.it 
Britain wants arms deals, not human rights 
The British government is so deeply engrossed in boosting its arms trade with Indonesia that its 
advocacy of linking aid to human rights and good gOW!rnance has been chucked out of the window. 
It obstructed Portuguese efforts during its EC presidency to pronounce on East Timor and rejected all 
demands here · in the UK for the suspension of aid. 
There was much fanfare when Foreign Secretary Douglas 
Hurd announced last August that he had called on the 
European Commission to cut aid to countries that violate 
human rights (Sunday Times, 18-08-1991]. The sequence 
might suggest that the 28 November 1991 Declaration of 
the EC Council of Ministers "that the Community and its 
Member States will explicitly introduce the consideration of 
human rights as an element of their relations with develop-
ment ~ountries" came largely as a result of British pressure. 
Coming a fortnight after the Santa Cruz massacre, what 
better test of this commitment than to apply it to Indonesia? 
The point was made by Labour's Shadow Minister for 
Overseas Development, Ann Clwyd MP, in a letter to the 
Financial Times, to which Minister Lynda Chalker replied: 
.. . the foreign secretary told the Indonesian foreign 
minister (on 5 February) that he welcomed the action taken 
so far but sought assurances that they would complete as 
promised the next stages of the investigation to bring to 
justice those responsible, search for the missing and take 
measures to prevent a recurrence. 
Indonesia remains one of the 50 poorest countries with 
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the fifth largest population. It has a well-deserved reputa-
tion for sound macro-economic management... Following 
the shootings in East Timor on November 12 the donor 
countries concluded that projects already agreed with the 
Indonesian government should continue as planned. Our 
projects include a number relating to tropical forestry, 
energy efficiency and the environment. These are key areas. 
[Financial Times, 19.02.1992] 
Ali Alatas could hard have put it better. 
Britain's silent diplomacy 
On 14 July 1992, a deputation from the British Coalition 
for East Timor met Gavin Hewitt, head of the Southeast 
Asia Department at the Foreign Office, to protest at British 
Aerospace's forthcoming sale of Hawks to Indonesia. Nick 
Harvey MP, Liberal Democrat, Ann Feltham from Cam-
paign Against Arms Trade, and Liem Soei Liong of 
TAPOL had a heated discussion about UK relations with 
Indonesia. While admitting that the human rights situation 
in East Timor was "far from satisfactory", Mr Hewitt said: 
"Foreign policy is realpolitik." Though he complimented the 
East Timor lobby in the UK for its effectiveness, he was 
scathing about Portuguese diplomacy. Britain prefers 'silent 
diplomacy' to 'megaphone diplomacy', he said. 
During Portugal's presidency of the European Community, 
from January to June 1992, Britain, in its position as the 
next EC president, represented Portugal in Indonesia, 
attending the trials of East Timorese and the military trials. 
While it certainly performed this duty thoroughly well and 
was better informed than most about the gross injustices of 
the trials, it would not allow these and other developments 
in East Timor to impinge on EC attitudes or its arms deals. 
The crunch came at the Lisbon EC Summit when Portugal 
was hoping to include a statement about East Timor in the 
Final Communique. But Britain was not willing, so the 
matter was shelved; EC decisions are all adopted by 
consensus. Nor would Britain agree to a joint EC statement 
on human rights being made at the Paris meeting of the 
aid-donors club, the Consultative Group on Indonesia. 
UK-Portuguese disagreements intensify 
Although Portugal had to Jive with its failure to take 
initiatives on behalf of East Timor during its EC presi-
dency, it has since seized on the opportunity of pressure in 
the EC to renew its cooperation accord with ASEAN by 
insisting that this will not happen until there is a marked 
improvement in the human rights situation in East Timor. 
The EC foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels, which was 
to have discussed renewal on 20 July, was forced to drop 
the matter without further debate because Foreign Minister 
Joao de Deus Pinheiro made such a powerful speech about 
East Timor, stunning the meeting into 'complete silence', 
according to Reuter. 
There is pressure in both regional groupings to renew the 
present cooperation agreement by upgrading economic ties 
and including political cooperation. This was to be on the 
agenda of this year's ASEAN-EC meeting in Manila at the 
end of July but Portugal has effectively blocked further 
progress in this direction. The UK argues that Lisbon's 
stance is "counter-productive" as the new EC-ASEAN 
accord will contain human rights provisions which do not 
exist in the current agreement. [Financial Times, 21-07-
1992) But ASEAN countries, with Indonesia and Malaysia 
very much to the fore, have insisted in past discussions with 
the EC that ASEAN countries have a 'different concept' of 
human rights. Hence, formulations agreed upon would give 
prominence to these differences and provide no basis for 
protecting human rights victims in Indonesia or ASEAN 
generally. 
In any case, human rights provisions which are not backed 
by positive action - as with the EC's 28 November 1991 
Declaration - get nowhere with Jakarta. The UK may find 
it more difficult to persuade Portugal to confine itself to 
'silent diplomacy', now that Portugal is no longer presiding 
over EC business and is freer to act according to its 
conscience. 
Portugal's decision to block renewal of the agreement 
could put it on a collision course with the UK which was 
hoping to use its EC presidency to the greatest effect for a 
variety of political objectives. 
Public opinion in the UK 
There has been a shift in public opinion about East Timor 
in the last eight months. It is no Jonger an unknown 
country. When former Defence Minister Alan CJark was 
challenged on Channel Four TV about Britain training 
Indonesian officers following the Santa Cruz killings, he 
poured contempt on 'aJl this fuss'. "Does anyone know 
where East Timor is?" he asked the audience, to which 
many replied: "Yes!" After explaining that arms deals mean 
jobs, he asked: "Shouldn't we do this?", to which the 
audience replied: "No!" 
Parliamentary support for actions against Indonesia is 
getting broader. Motions in the House of Commons to halt 
the arms trade and suspend aid now have Conservative MPs 
among the signatories. The House of Lords debate and the 
letters from MPs and peers to Douglas Hurd are signs of 
growing concern among Tories, making it more difficult for 
the government to ignore public opinion in its dealings with 
Indonesia. * 
Two 1imorese refugees, Estevao Cabral and Dolores Joaqu · · · 
front of the Indonesian Embassy in London, on Human Rioh:;'Dam 
December 1991. " '.J, 
Photo: Paul Slattery 
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The 'case' against Francisco Miranda Branco 
Following widespread criticism of the grotesque discrepancy between verdicts for East Timorese 
demonstrators and soldiers who opened fire on them, General Benny Murdani defended the results as 
being in accord with Indonesia s legal system. The Timorese, he said, "were found guilty of subversion 
while officers were found guilty of ignoring instructions". That speaks reams about justice in Indonesia 
but more to the point, all the trials were strictly in conformity with a scenario serving political aims. 
Gradually, the extent of the frame-up is becoming clearer as our analysis of both sets of trials shows. 
Francisco Miranda Branco, 41, was one of eight East 
Timorese to be tried for the 12 November demonstration 
and got a 15-year sentence, second only to life for 
Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha. The following summarises his 
Defence Plea, received recently in London, entitled, 
"Aspirations and innermost feelings of the East Timorese on 
trial". The 'case' against him is similar in many respects to 
the cases against most of the others (see box). 
Despite what Murdani said, only two were actually tried 
for subversion. The other six were tried under articles of the 
Criminal Code which allow a maximum of seven years; 
however, three got in excess of that. Had the prosecutor had 
his way, all would have got more than 8 years. 
The prosecution argued, and the courts agree, that the plan 
to hold a demonstration was aimed at undermining East 
Timor's integration. Ignoring all the documented evidence, 
particularly the Yorkshire TV footage which was not so 
much as mentioned, the prosecution argued, and the court 
agreed, that the demonstrators behaved provocatively and 
even that some were armed. 
The defendants argued that the status of East Timor is a 
matter for the international community to resolve. They 
were hoping to use the UN-sponsored MPs' visit to express 
their aspirations and call for negotiations. 
The Comite Executivo 
Francisco had worked for the Portuguese administration. In 
January 1976, he got a job working for the Indonesian 
administration and became a member of Korpri, the 
association of civil servants which all Indonesian 
government employees must join. At the time of his arrest, 
he was working tor the economics department of the local 
government administration. He is married with six children, 
aged from 2 to 15 years. He did not attend the 
demonstration in Dili on 12 November. He was arrested on 
6 December 1991. 
Branco was one of eight East Timorese who formed an ad 
hoc body, the Comite Executivo (CE), set up to handle the 
sensitive task of making contact with the Portuguese 
parliamentary mission which was to have visited East 
Timor. Branco and his friends wanted to take advantage of 
this UN-sponsored mission, hoping to enjoy the protection 
officially provided for anyone wanting to contact the MPs. 
Of the eight CE members, six have been tried and 
sentenced. The two not tried are Constancio Pinto whose 
whereabouts is unknown (if indeed he is still alive) and 
Filipe Gama Xavier. One mystery surrounding the trials is 
the role of Pinto. There is little doubt of the seniority of his 
position in the clandestine front and his arrest in January 
1991 8ent shock waves through the movement. He was 
released within days and although it was said then that he 
was under orders to spy on his colleagues, he clearly did 
not lose their confidence as he played such a prominent role 
in the preparations for the MPs' visit. In his defence plea, 
Gregorio notes that while he was in hospital after the 
demonstration, being treated for injuries, a security officer 
told him that Pinto is "working with us". Gregorio gives no 
hint of whether he believed this or not. 
Planning to meet the MPs 
Since Pope John Paul's visit East Timoi in October 1989, 
it had become the tradition for Timorese to demonstrate 
whenever foreign visitors came, the only chance for them 
to convey their feelings to the outside world, preferably in 
the presence of journalists. The Portuguese MPs' visit was 
to have been the climax of this strategy, an occasion for 
which the East Timorese spared no effort. 
Francisco Miranda 
Branco entering 
courtroom. 
The visit had been planned for years under UN auspices. 
Yet, Branco and his friends have been savagely punished 
for nothing more than trying to make use of this event. 
Branco explained why the CE was set up: 
On the basis of the Terms of Reference [for the mission] 
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agreed on 27 June 1991 by Portuguese and Indonesian 
representatives at the UN, under the auspices of the 
Secretary General, Constancio Pinto took the initiative to 
set up a Comite .Executivo to hand a petition of the 
National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) to the ' 
parliamentary mission, asking for dialogue. 
The two critical paragraphs of the Terms of Reference are: 
Paragraph ~ The Portuguese parliamentary delegation 
shall have unhindered access to all parts of the territory, 
within the context of the agreed objective of the visit, in 
conditions of peace and security. 
Paragraph 10: The Portuguese parliamentary delegation 
shall be free to meet whoever it wishes and anyone who 
wishes to meet the Portuguese parliamentary delegation will 
be allowed to do so. No action, including of a security 
nature, may be taken by the Indonesian authorities that 
could prejudice any potential or actual contacts. Individuals 
who meet the Portuguese parliamentary delegation shall not 
be made to suffer any adverse consequences as a result of 
these contacts. 
Branco said: "The CE was set up to ask the parliamentary 
mission to urge the Portuguese government to enter into 
dialogue with the Indonesian government and with 
representatives of the East Timorese pe.opJe, including those 
for and against ' integration with Indonesia. This was in line 
with UN General Assembly Resolution 37 /30, passed on 23 
November 1982, to reach a solution of the East Timor 
question that would be acceptable to all sides." 
The CE decided on 26 October to make preparations to 
welcome the parliamentary mission when it arrived on 4 
November with a petition drafted by Constancio Pinto and 
signed by aJJ the members; it asked the Portuguese and 
Indonesian governments together with East Timorese 
representatives, for as well as against integration, to seek a 
solution to the East Timor question acceptable to aJl sides, 
under UN auspices. 
Non-violence and peace 
Branco was explicit about his own political stance: "I 
uphold the principles of non-violence and peace. So, after 
the outbreak of the civil war in East Timor on 20 August, 
1975, I decided that whereas up till then, my sympathies 
lay with ASDT/Fretilin, I would no Jonger take sides with 
any party, including Fretilin, which is my position to the 
present day. In my opinion, parties only result in 
antagonism and conflicts between the East Timorese which 
can lead to their destruction, ultimately benefitting others." 
On integration 
Branco set forth his understanding of the events leading up 
to Indonesian integration, He incorporated into his defence 
plea the political programmes of the three main parties, 
ASDT/Fretilin, UDT and Apodeti. Although they had 
different demands for East Timor's future, they all, 
including Apodeti (which favoured integration with 
Indonesia), wanted a referendum. 
He referred to the 30 November 1975 Balibo Declaration 
signed by leaders of four East Timorese parties incJuding 
UDT and Apodeti, asking for integration with Indonesia but 
said that some of the signatories had since disavowed it. 
(This document is used by Indonesia to back its claim that 
integration took place 'at the request of the East Timorese 
people'.] . 
Branco quotes extensively from the report prod~ced. m 
1990 by sociologists from Gadjah Mada Umvers1ty, 
Yogyakarta, under Dr Mubyarto, which hig~ighted .trau~a 
and deep-rooted dissatisfaction in East T1D1or with life 
under Indonesian occupation. After quoting from the ten 
resolutions of the UN Security Council and Genera] 
Assembly he said that Resolution 37/30 of 23 November 
1982 ma~dates the Secretary General to consult with aU 
parties directly concerned, which further legitimises the 
intentions of the CE. 
Then came the Indonesian invitation in 1987 to the 
Portuguese Parliament to send a mission to East Timor. 
This led ultimately to arrangements for the mission to take 
place and the adoption of the Terms of Reference on 27 
June 1991. This is what led to the initiative to set up the 
CE. 
Branco and 12 November 
From the testimony of witnesses summarised in the Defence 
Plea of his lawyers, it transpires that Branco was not in 
favour of a demonstration to greet the Portuguese MPs; he 
would have preferred a welcome with dances and the 
presentation of flowers. When the visit was aborted, he 
apparently did not favour holding a demonstration on 12 
November, ~ did not attend and went to work instead. 
Posters listing the Santa Crur. victims, at a denw in front of the 
Indonesian embassy, 7 January 1992. 
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Draconian sentences for survivors 
1be seven others tried were: 
Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha, 28, given a Jife · 
sentence for taldlig the lead in the> 12 Nove~ 
demonStration. A .member of the CE. Employed for 
many.ycan a1 Dili General Hospital, _hewas active ··m~ 
protests during the Pape's Visit and the US ambassa~ 
dor's visit to Dili. He was wounded during thC 
demonstration. He told . the court he should not 1:>C . 
tried under Indonestan ·1aw as integration ·. haS nof . ·. 
been recognised intemaiionally. He · was previously 
arrested in 1989 for distributing 'illegal leaflets'. · 
Jadnto clas Neves Raimundo Alves, 34, was·.· · 
sentencecl·to ten years, two years more ·than asked.bY '.·· 
the pmileCtltion. He W:as a member of the CE. · H~·; 
ac.cepted -the services of the court defence lawyer( · 
Ponco Atmono. Little was reported about bis tri8);-, 
Antara · said be fainted · twice during the. proceedings. 
Saturnino da Costa Belo, 21, was :sentenced to . 
nine years. The on1j one to be '1ied at · Baucatr 
diStrict court, he refused to be defended either bY the' ·· 
ugal Aid Institute or the court lawyer, Ponc;o 
Atmono. He told the court he only wanted a Fretilin .. 
lawyer. Press reporting · of his trial was .· minimal. 
Carto5 · dm Santos Lemos, 30, mamed with two 
small ··. cliildren, waS >'~ntenced to eight years. lie .. 
worked as a truck driver for the local government. 
He wu ·a member of the CE. Most press reports of 
his trial desen'bed him as a 'Fretilin joumalistt __  
because he had the task of taking photos of the 12 
November demonstraµon to be se~t ab,toad. . Hi$ . · 
camera;WaS later.seized· and none of 'his,photos WCJ'Cf 
published. He agreed to be defendCd · by the court.. .. 
Jawyer,. · Ponco Atmono,. even though his wife bad ' 
arrange(J for the Legal Aid Institute to defend him. 
According to evidence in other trials, he wrote a 
book, Timor LestA Terra de &per(lllCa about atroc-itiea uo.der the mlioneaian occlipatiOn. · · 
Juvendo de Jesus Martins, 3Z, was :sentenced to 
six years and ten months. A civil ser\tant working · at 
-~ Jami and build!PB tax offtcC. A member 
bl CB, as responsible for · contacts and 
ti was accused of keeping conta~ 
and arranged <:ontaetS for the 
• , Mario Robalo, who visited Dili 
amed British journalist who 
mber, and met a Japane8e 
ed her to get •pport for Bast 
Witn~es' testimonies not refuted by Branco suggest that 
the CE did not plan the 12 November demonstration. 
Four of Branco's colleagues on the CE testified: Gregorio 
da Cunha Saldanha, Carlos dos Santos Lemos, Juvencio de 
Jesus Martins and Filomeno da Silva Fereira. Gregorio told 
the court that his interrogation statement (BAP) was made 
under duress and he therefore withdrew it. 
Two other civilian witnesses testified, both Indonesians 
with Balinese names, about the procession on 12 November 
which they saw while standing along the route or in offices 
passed by the procession. In neither case would Branco 
comment on their testimony as he was not present. 
Four military witnesses were called but only one appeared 
- Lamiren (rank not stated), a deputy group commander 
from Battalion 303. His testimony dealt with what happened 
before and after the troops opened fire. Again, Branco made 
no comment. 
The three soldiers who failed to appear because of 'duties 
elsewhere' were: Private Dominggus da Costa, Major Andi 
Gerhan Lantara and Rudolf Roja. The first two were 
allegedly wounded by demonstrators, · so their non-
appearance is all the more incomprehensible, particularly 
the non-appearance of Lantara, an officer with Battalion 
700 whose role in events surrounding the demonstration has 
been totally obliterated; his battalion was spirited out of 
East Timor within days of the massacre. Lantara himself 
left immediately after the massacre and has avoided any 
publicity ever since. None of the soldiers tried in the 
courts-martial was from Battalion 700. 
The defence were unable to produce any witnesses. They 
named two - Laurentina and Emanuel da Costa Belo - but 
the prosecutor who should have summoned them to appear, 
claimed that they did not want to come as they said they 
"know nothing about the activities of the accused or the 12 
November demonstration". 
Lawyers' defence 
Branco's lawyers raised a host of major issues. They were 
clearly disturbed by the mystery surrounding so many 
incidents before the massacre and provided important new 
data about the so-called 'brawl' on 28 October at Motael 
church. (See page 8.) They vehemently rejected prosecution 
claims that the CE meetings were 'illegal' or 'clandestine'. 
Anyone could have attended and they took place in people's 
homes with no attempt at secrecy. They also drew heavily 
on the prevailing atmosphere of fear in East Timor and 
quoted also from UN resolutions to prove that its status is 
still a matter for international settlement. J} 
0 - ... 
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Motael victims punished 
Five young East Timorese have been sentenced on charges of involvement in the murder of an East 
Timorese who was one of a group of Indonesian agents who attacked Motael church, Dili, where they 
were taking refuge, when their colleague, Sebastiao Gomes was also killed. However, no-one has been 
charged for the murder of Sebastiao Gomes. 
These trials yet again highlight the bias of the Indonesian 
courts in trying a group of men who were targets of a 
premeditated attack on their place of refuge while those 
who killed their colleague Gomes are allowed to go scot 
free. 
Sebastiao Gomes was murdered at Motael Church on 28 
October 1991. It was his death that was being commemor-
ated on 12 November when troops opened fire on peaceful 
demonstrators. 
Bobby Xavier, at 19, the youngest of the group, was 
sentenced to three years. From the start, he told the court 
that the men with Afonso Hendrigues who died in the 
incident, should be charged with Sebastiao's murder. During 
the course of the trial, he was clearly under very great 
emotional strain and broke down while one session was in 
progress. He had just told the court that he was under 
duress during interrogation and now wanted to retract the 
statements attributed to him in the interrogation report 
which he signed. Instead of trying to investigate this very 
serious complaint, the judge proceeded to persuade him not 
to retract his earlier statements. 
When sentence was pronounced on 24 June, Xavier 
greeted the verdict with: Viva Timor! When the judge asked 
whether he would appeal against the sentence, his response 
was: "/ will not appeal or seek presidential clemency. It 
would be better to appeal to and seek clemency from 
Xanana Gusmao in the jungle. " 
The others sentenced with Xavier are: Aleixo da Silva, 
22, given two years and three months; Joao dos Santos, 23, 
and Jacob da Silva, 27, who were both given two years; 
and Bonifacio Barreto, who was sentenced to 20 months. >f. 
What really happened on 28 October? 
Lawyers defending Francisco Miranda Branco have shed new light on the incident in Motael Church 
on 28 October 1991, when Sebastiao Gomes was killed. Their defence plea, read out in the Dili district 
court on 23 May 1992, gives some very pertinent facts. This account, slightly abridged below, 
highlights the need for a thorough investigation to discover what triggered the events on 12 November. 
A religious dignitary believes that what happened on 12 
November has its roots in earlier events when a number of 
youths who felt threatened sought refuge in Motael Church. 
Security officials said they had nothing to fear and they 
should go home, but when they did, they were threatened 
and others in their families were threatened as well. 
On 5 October 1991, during.the Army· Day celebration, the 
military commander, Brig-Geriefal Warouw, made a remark 
expressing his dissatisfaction with this state of affairs. 
On 27 October in the late afternoon, according to the 
same source, several people on motor-bikes who were 
shouting loudly, rode round and round the church, 
occasionally throwing stones at it. Soon after midnight, on 
28 October, several people who were also shouting, started 
throwing stones more persistently in the direction of the 
church poly-clinic. The young people inside rushed out to 
chase these trouble-makers off. It was not possible to avoid 
a fight in which Sebastiao Gomes was involved. He was 
shot by someone firing from the direction of the sea-front 
to the north, as he came through the front gate. He fell to 
the ground, hit by four or five bullets. Another bullet hit a 
tree in front of the church; that bullet is still embedded in 
the tree. His body was found in front of the church gate. An 
autopsy was performed at the hospital and he was buried at 
Santa Cruz Cemetery. 
An eye-witness added that at almost the same time, the 
body of Afonso [Hendrigues] was found on the same road 
with injuries inflicted by a sharp implement. It is not clear 
Tunorese taking refuge in Motael church, October 1990, Dili. Back 
row, centre: Aleixo da Gama (sentenced to 2 yrs 3 mths) and, 
squatting on the right: Gregorio Saldanha (life sentence). 
~ 
who killed him. According to the eye-witness, the body of 
Afonso, who was known in the community as an agent 
working for the security forces, was lying about 20 metres 
from Sebastiao's body. Blood was smeared several metres 
away from the body, to the west. There is strong reason to 
believe that Afonso was not killed at the place where the 
fighting took place but had been killed earlier, somewhere 
else, and his body put in front of the church. This was done 
so as to create the impression that he was killed with a 
sharp implement used by youngsters taking refuge in the 
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church. 
Local inhabitants who had been awakened by the 
continuous ringing of church bells rushed out to see what 
had happened at the church but were held back by security 
forces who were standing guard in a radius of tens of 
metres from the church; they told the people to go home. 
Brig.General Warouw's 5 October remarks and the fact 
that troops were on guard to prevent people from getting 
near the church have led people to suspect that the death of 
Sebastiao was pre-arranged. Later, troops entered the 
church and carried out a search. Some weeks later, reports 
appeared in the press that a number of sharp implements, 
banners and other things had been found hidden away in 
the church. The parish priest, Father Alberto Ricardo da 
Silva, said he knew nothing about any such things being 
found; he only saw them later when summoned by the 
police. The police admitted that it was an 'oversight' on 
their part not to draw up a record of confiscation. 
Another aspect confirmed by Fr Ricardo is that an escaped 
prisoner, known to his friends as 'Aliong' had taken refuge 
in the church. This gave the security forces an excuse to 
enter the church in the days prior to 28 October in order to 
search for him. According to another version, Aliong was 
'let out' and told to take refuge in the church some days 
before 28 October to give the security forces an excuse to 
search the church. This is undoubtedly the man who 
escaped from prison with Jose Antonio Joaquim Galucho, 
whose wife is shortly to go on trial. 
Prisoner's wife to be charged for slander 
Yet another extraordinary case is soon to come to court in 
Dili. The accused will be Joanita de Jesus Viegas Galu-
cho, whose husband, Jose Antonio Joaquim Galucho, is 
serving a two-year sentence for his pa1t in the demonstra-
tion which greeted US ambassador, John Monjo, when he 
was on a visit to Dili in January 1990. 
The case against Mrs Galucho truly exceeds all compre-
hension. She is to be charged for slandering government 
officials. Why? Last October, when visiting her husband in 
prison, he told her a co-prisoner had overheard prison 
officials discussing a plan to exterminate him. Shocked by 
the news, she wrote to Governor Mario Viegas Carrascalao, 
seeking protection for her husband. It is not at all unusual 
for people in Dili to tum to the governor as he has often 
been willing to help in cases of injustice. 
Wishing to pursue the matter, Carrascalao sent copies of 
her letter to other officials, including the military com-
mander, and added a plea of his own that Galucho had 
already been punished and no further action should be taken 
against him. As a result, Joanita was summoned for interro-
gation and told she would be charged with slander. 
Meanwhile, her husband and a co-prisoner identified in 
the Indonesian press only as 'David' managed to escape 
from prison on 21 October. David is almost certainly David 
da Conceicao Sinai also known as Aleong, whose name 
appeared in a list of prisoners, along with that of Jose 
Antonio Joaquim Galucho, received from Dili in the early 
part of 1991. Sinai was re-arrested in Motael Church on 28 
October but Galucho remained in hiding until March 1992 
when he was re-arrested in Liquica. 
Even Governor Carrascalao has expressed amazement that 
charges are being brought against Mrs Galucho. Luhut 
Pangaribuan of the Legal Aid Institute, to whom she has 
turned for help, said her letter was private and it was the 
governor who showed it to others. If anyone has to be sued 
for slander, it should be the governor, he said. [Kompas, 
10.06.1992] 
However, the Dili prosecutor's office later announced that 
Mrs Galucho would be tried under Article 310 and 311 of 
the Criminal Code for slandering officials. [Kompas, 
19.06.1992] .. 
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The military trials and the truth behind the Dili massacre 
Short sentences were meted out to soldiers by military courts in connection with the Santa Cruz 
massacre. A Timorese student at the trials felt sure they were held to satisfy foreign governments. They 
took only 8 days to complete. But more seriously, the question of which military unit fired first at the 
defenceless crowd is still unresolved. 
The military trials took place as a result of Suharto's 
decision to adopt severa] measures after the massacre. The 
installation of the DKM (Dewan Kehormatan Militer, 
Council of Military Honour) to investigate and take disci-
plinary action in the army was unprecedented in the 26 
years of Suharto's rule. In the face of stinging criticism, 
Suharto realised he had lost his grip over the military, 
especially in East Timor. The DKM had to sort things out. 
Disciplining officers and punishing soldiers would impress 
foreign governments and restore Suharto's hold over the 
military. Suharto knew he could not take things into his 
own hands so needed the DKM as broker. 
Cleaning the stable 
It is no accident that Lt.General Feisal Tanjung was chosen 
to chair the DKM. Known as one of the few intellectuals 
among today's generals, he is not loyal to General Benny 
Murdani in the Hankam group. A common feature of the 
members of this group are their interest in East Timor. 
Practically the entire top brass of ABRI has done combat 
duty in East Timor or won rapid promotion because of this. 
Some have retired from active army and hold senior posts. 
Lt.General Sugiarto is Minister of Transmigration, Major-
General Sembiring Kami Meliala is a member of the Peo-
ple's Congress (MPR), Major-General Dading Kalbuadi is 
Inspector-General at the Defence Ministry. U.General 
Sabala Rajagukguk and Lt.General Harsudiono Hartas are 
top ranking officers at ABRI headquarters. 
The relatively independent FeisaJ Tanjung is Dean of 
SESKOAD (the Army Higher Staff School). The rather 
messy job of cleaning the stable (the army command in 
East Timor) needed to be done by someone outside head-
quarters. 
The DKM findings were spectacular: six officers disci-
plined, three dismissed from the army and three removed 
from their positions. The entire top echelon in East Timor 
was removed. On top of that, the DKM ordered the court 
martial of nine soldiers and a police officer. Suharto risked 
open revolt in the army. The DKM's proposals were devas-
tating for the rank-and-file. Officer corps discontent bor-
dered on the brink. 
To repair the damage, Suharto this month invited all 121 
battalion commanders to his private ranch in West Java 
after chief-of-staff General Edi Sudradjat, likely to become 
the next commander-in-chief, gave 11.2 billion rupiahs 
(about US$3.5m) to the commanders to improve conditions 
for the troops. President Suharto addressed the commanders 
as a father-figure, concerned with the economic welfare of 
the soldiers. To boost morale, Sudradjat told the officers: 
"lbe Dili incident should not make you afraid or hesitant 
in taking decisions". 
The military trials 
All the military trials were held at military courts in Den 
-----{}"S ' ,~', N 
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Anti-riot squads beating East Timorese protesters, January 1990. 
Photo: Jenny Groves 
Pasar or the regional police headquarters. They were open 
to the public and British and Japanese embassy staff were 
present. Press reporting was extensive. 
The ten defendants can be divided into four groups. Three 
were NCO officers: Sergeants Udin Syukur, Aloysius Rani 
and Petrus Saul Mada and two were privates, Mateus Maya 
and Afonso de Jesus. The third group consisted of low-
ranking officers: 2nd Lieutenant Mursanib, 2nd Lt. John 
Arlan Aritonang and Handrianus Eddy Sunaryo. The others, 
Lt Yohannes Alexander Penpada and Police Corporal 
Marthin Alau (see box) are the fourth group. 
The three sergeants bad been assigned to stay at the 
subdistrict military command, KODIM 1627. According to 
their testimonies, they went into action on seeing their 
superior, Major Gerban Lantara and his aide Private 
Dominggus carried in, bleeding, after being stabbed by 
demonstrators. They all admitted shooting at demonstrators. 
None was wearing full military dress when they rushed to 
the scene of the demonstration. 
The two privates were assigned to drive Major Lantara to 
the hospital and admitted shooting at random at 
demonstrators from the car. 
The three sergeants were in command of three platoons 
(72 men) as riot control units for the demonstration. The 
front line was a Brimob (Mobile Brigade) unit, while 
platoons II and III were from Battalion 303. At one point 
the two platoons moved forward, as instructed by Lt. 
Mursanib _and after hearing shooting from other 
unidentified forces, they also opened fire. ' 
The fourth group were assigned to monitor the 
demonstration. Lt. Penpada, deputy intelligence officer at 
the district military command KOREM 164, after learning 
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about the stabbing of Major Lantara, rushed to grab his 
pistol. He said he slapped demonstrators but denied using 
his gun. 
Marthin Alau was the only police officer put on trial (see 
Box). 
All were tried under Article 103 section 1, for disobeying 
orders, despite the fact that nine admitted shooting at the 
crowd. 
Corporal Alau is a murderer 
Corporal Louis Pereira Marthin Alau, a policeman con-
victed on 30 May 1991 of injuring a demonstrator during 
the Santa Cruz massacre and sentenced to 17 months, is 
mentioned in testimony by ·a Timorese who was badly 
injured in the massacre and who saw him kill two wounded 
demonstrators. The testimony was found among documents 
received in Lisbon from the resistance movement earlier 
this year. 
The witness, whose name cannot be divulged, first 
describes how he fled as the soldiers fired into the crowd 
and was hit in the right shoulder and the left buttock. As 
other wounded people were being stabbed to death, he 
pretended to be dead. He continued: 
I lay on the ground, immobile. Meanwhile a secret 
policeman notorious for the number of killings he has 
committed, known by the name Alau, was chasing a 
colleague who could hardly run and who had a large red 
stain on his chest. Alau kicked the unfortunate man to the 
ground. He continued to attack him, stabbing him three 
times on his left side, and as the victim was still groaning, 
he shot him in the head, blowing his brains out. Te"ified, 
I closed my eyes. 
As I was barely three or four metres away, I tried to make 
out that I was dead. Then, a short way ahead of me I heard 
a noise; I opened my eyes and saw Alau running towards 
a young man who was on the ground, covered in blood, 
screaming with pain. Seeing that the man was still alive, 
Alau stabbed him twice which silenced him for ever. 
Corporal Alau was found guilty of cutting off the ear of 
one of the demonstrators. * 
Frame-up? 
Till now, all the burning issues regarding the massacre 
remain unresolved. With the exception of the 19 graves, no 
other graves have been disclosed. The first official casualty 
figure of 19 dead was changed to 50 dead and 90 missing 
but no names have been revealed. The KPN, the National 
Inquiry Commission, issued its final report which is yet to 
be made public by Suharto. 
There is every reason to be suspicious of the military 
trials. How were the ten defendants selected? Everybody in 
platoons II and III had fired at the demonstrators (93 
rounds). The defendants gave the impression of a chaotic, 
poorly disciplined Indonesian army. This reinforces the 
amok theory propagated by the army. Though admittedly, 
a demonstration of 5,000 high-spirited people can throw 
troops into a panic, the truth lies elsewhere. 
Portuguese Parliamentary Visit 
Preparations for the visit of the Portuguese MPs (PPD) were 
proceeding at a high pitch. Months in advance, fresh troops 
had arrived in East Timor as if a second invasion was under 
way. In 1991, a new intelligence operation, Operasi Elang 
11;,N:!l.RY TRIALS 
(Operation Eagle) was installed to deal with the Frente 
Clandestine, the Clandestine Front of youth in the cities. 
From captured documents (see TAPOL Bulletin no.105) the 
aim was to expose clandestine networks in Dili, Baucau and 
elsewhere and discover the plans for the MPs' visit. The 
intelligence operations were coordinated by BAIS (Strategic 
Intelligence Agency) which had been created by Benny 
Murdani to consolidate his power base. 
Besides BAIS, there is the older BAKJN. But in East 
Timor things are even more complex as several lines of 
command exist side by side. 
Kolakops 
Unlike other territorial commands, East Timor has Kolakops 
interposed between KODAM, the Area Military Command, 
and KOREM, the Regional Military Command. With 
KOLA.KOPS, territorial forces in East Timor can bring in 
reinforcements from other military commands. KOLA.KOPS 
is both territorial and operational and divides East Timor 
into three regions - A in the east; B, centre and west; and 
C, Dili. East Timor is also classified into zones, 'red' zones 
where guerrillas are active, 'green' zones where guerrillas 
are less active, and 'yellow' zones where they are practica1ly 
non-existent. The red zone, mostly in mountains, are battle 
zones where skirmishes take place. The yellow zones 
require a combination of territorial and combat operations. 
Military units in East Timor include troops from KODAM 
Udayana in Bali and units from other KODAMs. The 
battalions brought in are territorial or combat. 
In November 1991, the Dili Military Command, KOREM 
164 Wiradharma, was run by Colonel J.B.Sepang (since, 
removed) with 6 territorial and 4 combat battalions, includ-
Sultan Suharto still enjoys support from substantial sections of the 
military. 
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ing Battalion 744 (mainly East Timorese) an Udayana 
battalion, Battalion 303 from West Java, and Battalion 700 
from South Sulawesi. The latter are combat forces who 
were stationed in the red B zone but were transferred to 
Dili for the expected demonstrations. Battalion 303 is from 
KOSTRAD, the elite reserve troops. Together with Battalion 
700 (an airborne battalion) they were given a 10-day crash 
course in riot control. 
Law and order are now taken care of by the police so Dili 
has welJ-trained Brimob (Mobile Brigade) unit and anti-
riot police squads. 
Who tired first? 
The trials of 2nd Lts Sugiman Mursanib (SM) and John 
Aritonang (JA) produced some far from conclusive bits of 
evidence. SM was in command of an anti-riot force 
consisting of Brimob platoon 5486 and platoons II and III 
from Battalion 303, in that order. His task was to monitor 
and report every move of the demonstration. JA was com-
mander of platoon IL When they arrived at the cemetery, 
they faced thousands of demonstrators. SM told the court 
that, confronted by an uncontrollable crowd, he ordered the 
303 platoons to go ahead of the Brimob troops and claims 
that the first command to shoot did not come from him. As 
his troops neared the cemetery, they heard shots from the 
main gate. "There were unidentified troops. We only heard 
the shots" [Editor, 13.06.1992]. SM said the order to go to 
the cemetery was so hasty, he had no time to dress fully. 
When Yorkshire's Cold Blood was shown on TV, 
Timorese refugees in Lisbon recognised SM, in a T-shirt, 
giving orders to troops around the cemetery. Former 
prisoner Donaciano Gomes told Channel Four News that 
SM had interrogated and tortured him. 
Besides this shooting, a hail of bullets came from the 
southern side of the cemetery. JA confirms that shooting 
came from two directions and identified the troops as 
coming from A Company, Sector C of Battalion 303. He 
said some· wore uniforms while others wore a variety of 
clothing. 
On hearing the shooting, the two 303 platoons joined in. 
People were falling to the ground but the shooting con-
tinued, especially from the unidentified troops. The judges 
did not probe further. The unidentified pasukan liar 
(irregular troops), as the Indonesian press calls them, 
remained liar (the word also means 'wild'). 
Provocation and amok theories 
The trials of Lt. Mursanib and Lt. Aritonang support the 
amok theory but leave many questions unanswered. Both 
spoke about the unidentified troops. The other defendants 
also stuck to the amok theory with no suggestion of 
provocation. 
The provocation theory suggests that the Santa Cruz 
massacre was premeditated murder, a traditional intelligence 
operation of letting the enemy (here, an unarmed crowd) 
come into the open so as to strike. The killings in Tanjung 
Priok in 1984 had the same ingredients. They give the 
military justification to hit hard. Another justification for 
the use of violence in Dili was the claim that the demon-
strators were carrying weapons and started the shooting. 
The prosecution took care in the trials of the East Timo-
rese to produce evidence to support this version. In Greg-
orio da Cunha Saldanha's trial, it was claimed that some 
demonstrators were carrying firearms and grenades. They 
dragged along Afonso Gomes, father of the murdered 
Sebastiao Gomes, to say this as a witness, though he was 
clearly under strain; one press report said that his words 
were scarcely audible. 
A hearing in Gregorio's trial was held at the police 
weapons depot to display the weapons which had been 
confiscated; when Gregorio asked for the Yorkshire film 
(where no-one is seen bearing weapons) to be shown the 
judge said it was not relevant. 
Mursanib claimed that there was shooting from the crowd. 
But the crucial point is not whether some demonstrators 
were carrying firearms, but whether they were genuine 
demonstrators or intelligence plants. Reliable sources insist 
that intelligence agents were in the crowd and behaved pro-
vocatively. The verdict against Gregorio listed firearms -
Mauser and Garrand rifles, FN 46 and Colt 36 pistols, 
Korean hand- grenades and ammunition - as having been 
confiscated; no evidence was produced about who from. 
What happened to Battalion 700? 
The missing link is Battalion 700, in particular because the 
trials pinned the blame squarely on Battalion 303 which 
reinforces the amok theory. It was shown that shooting 
came from three directions; two from where 303 units were. 
But the crucial shooting which started first and ended last, 
remains a mystery. 
The army's original version claimed that troops were 
infuriated on hearing that Major Gerhan Lantara had been 
stabbed, rushed to the scene and started firing at random. 
This can only be part of the story, as the shooting from the 
unidentified troops seems to have been less 'accidental'. The 
Timorese Battalion 744 was not on the spot, while Battalion 
700 was on duty that day as confirmed by Brig.General 
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Rudy Warouw who was then in charge of East Timor. 
Major Gerhan Lantara, deputy-commander of Battalion 
700, is an interesting figure. His battalion was sent to East 
Timor on special assignment to deal with the clandestine 
front, and he was put in charge of intelligence in Sector ~ 
(Dili). Lantara is widely acknowledged to be a 'Murdam 
man'. Unlike most soldiers who regard service in East 
Timor as a hardship post, Major Gerhan accepts his tours 
of duty in East Timor with missionary zeal As a young 
cadet from the military academy, he spent time fighting the 
guerrillas. After graduation, he was again assigned to East 
Timor and has spent altogether eight years there. 
During the demonstration Major Lantara got into a scuffle 
with demonstrators after taking out a camera to make 
photos, and was aJJegedly stabbed. Private Second Class 
Dominggus, who rushed to help him, was also hurt. The 
next day Lantara was rushed to the Army Hospital in 
Jakarta and was seen by some eyewitnesses who were 
travelling on the same plane. Four days after the massacre, 
Battalion 700 was quietly withdrawn from East Timor. Two 
weeks later, Battalion 303 left East Timor amid great fan-
fare. Why was Major Lantara never summoned as a 
witness? Why were all the military defendants from 303? 
Why did Lantara and Battalion 700 disappear from the 
scene of the crime? 
One likely answer is already suggested above; this 
confirms the amok theory. But political analysts have 
another interesting hypothesis and link the issue with the 
conflict over the leadership of ABRI. Suharto wants his 
brother-in-Jaw Maj-Gen. Wismoyo to take over, at the 
very least as deputy chief-of-staff of the army. Putting all 
the blame on Battalion 303 means pointing the finger at 
Wismoyo, commander of KOSTRAD. 
MILITARY TRIALS 
The controversial 'opening up' 
A detective story always needs a motive. If Battalion 700 
was involved · in the premeditated killings, what was the 
motive? To find the answer we must look at the conflict in 
Jakarta over military rule in East Timor between Suharto 
and his kitchen-cabinet, and the HANKAM group. 
For external reasons Suharto was in favour of "keterbu-
kaan" (opening up) in East Timor. Access to East Timor 
became easier but there were negative consequences for the 
military. The flow of information from East Timor became 
easier, the clandestine movement became stronger and 
bolder. The well-publicised demonstration during the visit 
of US ambassador John Monjo in January 1990 was an 
embarrassment for the security forces. In 1991, the military 
knew that preparations were under way for a huge rally 
originally intended for the Portuguese MPs but replaced by 
the Santa Cruz demonstration, so they used it to make their 
point. Their message to Suharto was: the people have 
become uncontrollable, we had to step in. What we do in 
East Timor is our business, don't let foreigners interfere. 
The final word has not yet been spoken. The several 
groups are still at odds and, as one Indonesian oppositionist 
says: ''East Timor can become Indonesia's Mozambique". 
Further reading: 
Who gave the order?, FITUN no.6, Jan.1992, pp 1-8 
East Timor, the Courts-Martial, Asia Watch, vol.4 no.16. 
Whatever happened to Gerhan Lantara?, Tim Kell, Jan.-
1992. 
More juggling with figures 
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House of Lords debates East Timor 
Peers from all sides of the House of Lords made ringing condemnations of Indonesia s annexation and 
war of aggression against East Timor, during a debate on 16 July 1992. This is the first time East 
Timor has been discussed so comprehensively in the British Parliament. Top of the peers demands were 
an arms embargo, the suspension of economic aid, and an end to training Indonesian officers in the 
UK. 
The one-and-a-half hour debate was initiated by Labour 
peer, Lord Rea, who visited East Timor with other British 
parliamentarians in March 1989. He devoted much of his 
speech to telling the East Timor story, because it has not 
before found its way into Hansard. Indonesia's war over the 
past 16 years has been exceptionally brutal while resistance 
to Indonesian ruJe has been remarkably consistent. He gave 
an overview of human rights and massacres in Indonesia 
going back to 1965, then turned to Britain's arms trade. 
"When criticised, the Government's usual response is that 
all countries are entitled to purchase arms for their 
legitimate defence. But Indonesia has no external enemies. 
Its armed forces exist solely to keep order within its own 
te"itories; in other words, to suppress its own people. " 
It was up to the international community, he said to show 
in actions as well as in words "that it will not tolerate any 
further violation of internationally-accepted human rights 
standards". 
Tory peer's maiden speech 
Lord Finsberg, formerly Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, the Conser-
vative MP for Hampstead and Highgate, devoted his maiden 
speech to East Timor. This being a special occasion, friends 
were in the House to support him, notably Baroness 
Thatcher who, as she later congratulated him, must have 
wondered why he spoke so passionately against Indonesia, 
a regime fiavoured by her during her premiership. 
He said he had led UK delegations to the Council of 
Europe and the Western European Union for the past five 
years where Portuguese MPs had asked them to discuss 
East Timor. Confirming everything Lord Rea said, he went 
on: "The contrast between the world's immediate reaction 
to Iraq's annexation of Ku.wait and what has happened in 
East Timor makes us wonder whether there are double 
standards when a nation is further away and out of the 
limelight.... The human rights of the people of East Timor 
have been appallingly broken. They have not been allowed 
to determine their own political destiny or to preserve their 
cultural or linguistic identities. " 
He referred to the resolutions on East Timor adopted by 
the parliamentary assemblies of the Council of Europe and 
the WEU and reminded the Government that both had 
called for an immediate arms embargo and the suspension 
of military support for Indonesia. What response had it 
given? Ending, he said: "East Timor has been the subject 
of murder, rape and pillage for well over 15 years .... Let us 
at least do something for the people of East Timor who, as 
I know from conversations with them and with Portuguese, 
feel cut off and ignored by the civilised world. That is a 
charge which should lie heavily on our consciences. " 
Lord Avebury, Liberal-Democrat, chair of the Parlia-
mentary Human Rights Group and co-initiator of Parlia 
Lord Rea arriving at Dili airport, March 1989. 
mentarians for East Timor, dealt in a speech of more than 
half an hour with many aspects. He assailed the government 
for having stood in the way of any EC summit statement on 
East Timor. 
After strongly criticising the Indonesian commission of 
inquiry and describing the present situation in East Timor, 
he regretted the fact that the report of Dr Amos Wako's 
visit to East Timor had not been made public. "That 
statement must be made public if donors are to evaluate the 
atrocity and Jakarta's response to it. In any case, we paid 
for it... and are entitled to know the contents. " 
Of special interest is Lord Avebury's reference to the 
Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War which prohibits killing, 
torture, unJawfuJ deportation and so on. As party to the 
Convention, the UK is obliged under Article 146 "to search 
for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered 
to be committed, such grave breaches". What checks do we 
make of the background of personnel from the Indonesian 
armed forces seeking entry to the UK, incJuding those 
invited to undergo training here, to see whether they should 
be brought before our courts and tried? 
The Bishop of Worcester 
The Bishop of Worcester, Dr Philip Goodrich, paid special 
tribute to the courage of Bishop Belo who has called for a 
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determined intervention by the international community for 
a well-conducted referendum. It was regrettable that no 
army officer had been tried for ordering the massacre. 
Calling for an arms embargo, he asked: "Can we justify the 
sale of 40 Hawk aircraft and the invitation to three 
Indonesian army officers to study in the UK?" Cutting such 
military support would, he said "be clear signals that we 
cannot condone the present ugly regime in East Timor". 
Lord Hatch of Lusby, Labour, has persistently questioned 
the Government about East Timor. In his speech, he asked 
about Britain's arms trade with Indonesia. Was it true that 
the UK sold major weapons systems worth £522m to 
Indonesia from 1985 to 1990? "Where do the government 
stand when the UN condemns another state for aggression? 
Do they continue to supply that country with aid despite the 
fact that (they) have laid down. .. that in fu.ture aid will 
depend on good governance? Let them come clean now?" 
An Independent peer, Lord Haden-Guest was next to 
speak, noting the heartening change in international opinion 
and growing awareness of what is going on in East Timor. 
There have been well-informed articles in the serious 
British press and important contributions from the PHRG, 
the British Coalition for East Timor and TAPOL. He dealt 
also with the recent decision of the US House of Represen-
tatives to cut military aid and a resolution by the Confer-
ence of US Mayors calling for a resolution on East Timor 
at the UN General Assembly. He ended by saying that all 
governments, including the UK "should join ranks and, by 
withholding arms to Indonesia, bring to an end the appal-
ling state of affairs in East Timor ". 
Lord Judd, formerly Frank Judd, Director of OXFAM, 
drew the debate to a close with a long speech devoted 
largely to the arms trade, with Britain's role second only to 
the US, the soon-to-be-concluded :Hawks deal, and the 
sale of the Green Rover to the Indonesian Navy. Regarding 
the Santa Cruz massacre, the Government had admitted that 
British Land Rovers were used by troops responsible for 
that outrage but had later argued that "these are not arms". 
Arms or not, said Lord Judd, they obviously played a 
crucial part in that atrocity. 
[Baroness Trumpington, speaking later for the Govern-
ment, showed the shallowness of her grasp, saying: "My 
farmer friends would laugh about the part in the speech of 
Lord Judd about Land Rovers and to think they were 
driving around in offensive weaJXJns. '1 
Lord Judd made the link between arms exports and British 
policy: "To make matters worse, the Government's willing-
ness to sell arms has been translated into a consistent 
series of abstentions in the UN on resolutions condemning 
the Indonesian Government. Perhaps even more sinister is 
the fact that this is almost certainly what lay behind the 
repeated, cynical manoeuvres by the British Government to 
frustrate humanitarian initiatives by the EC under the 
leadership of the Portuguese during their presidency of the 
Community. " 
Turning to aid to Indonesia at a yearly average of £20.27 
from 1988-1990, making it the biggest recipient of UK aid 
in the Far East, he said this "contradicts certain key factors 
which normally determine the allocation of aid. For 
example, Indonesia is neither one of the poorest countries 
in the region nor is it a member of the Commonwealth. 
Moreover, its JJOOr human rights record and illegal occu -
pation of East Timor raise fu.ndamental issues about its 
suitability for such aid. " 
The remainder of his speech consisted of a series of 
questions, after which he accused the Government of using 
EASTTIMOR 
smooth diplomatic talk and hypocrisy in its approach on 
Indonesia. "It is high time for them to emulate their 
determination on Kuwait and vigorously use their presi -
dency of the EC to ensure that in the Community and at the 
UN effective pressure is at last brought to bear on the cruel 
tyrants of Jakarta." 
The Government's response 
Baroness Trumpington, for the Foreign Office, stuck closely 
to her brief, answering questions about which she had been 
given advance notice, and simply refusing to give way 
when Lord Avebury interrupted to seek clarifications. 
No, the government did not have Dr Wako's report as the 
UN Secretary-General has decided not to release it. Yes, 
we still look to the Indonesians to pursue follow-up action 
according to the UN Human Rights Commission statement 
on 4 March 1992 [see TAPOL Bulletin, No 111]. Yes, we 
did make representatives on 30 June about the discrepancies 
in sentencing those charged in connection with the events 
(sic) in Dili. Yes, we do take full account of human rights 
issues in determining aid policy for different countries but, 
'j4s regards Indonesia, we believe that its JXJVerty and its 
record of sound economic JXJlicy justify a continuation of 
id II a . 
Aid in 1991-92 was £21.4m plus debt relief of £2.27m 
and would be at about the same level in 1992-93. As for 
arms, defence sales were subject to strict export controls. 
As for training army officers, this was intended "to improve 
the competence and discipline; and by introducing them to 
our principles, methods and values, it increases their 
awareness of the imJXJrtance of good government, democ-
racy and respect for human rights". 
[The British Coalition for East Timor plans to reproduce the 
debate, which runs into twelve pages of Hansard. Look out 
for an announcement of availability and price.] * 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 112, August 1992 15 
EASTTIMOR 
MPs from all parties want aid cut 
Members of Parliament from all the main parties in both Houses of Parliament wrf!te to Foreig_n 
Secretary Douglas Hurd on 7July1992, calling on the British government to suspend aid to Indonesia 
because of the situation in East Timor. Their letter reads as follows: 
We write to ask you whether Britain will issue a statement 
on the occasion of the meeting in Paris on 16-17 July of 
the Consultative Group on Indonesia, the new aid 
consortium chaired by the World Bank, emphasising its 
deep concern about the human rights situation in East 
Timor. 
As you know, it was at Indonesia's instigation that the 
former aid consortium, the Inter-Governmental Group on 
Indonesia, was disbanded, following criticism of the Santa 
Cruz Massacre by the Dutch Government which had chaired 
IGGI, and which suspended its aid to Indonesia pending a 
satisfactory response to their criticism. Similar action was 
also taken by Canada and Denmark. 
However, the Indonesian Government aimed their 
criticism only at The Hague, and in so doing, signalled their 
rejection of conditionality of economic aid, which takes 
account of the recipient country's human rights record. We 
think that this should not go unchalJenged; the principle of 
conditionality has been advanced by you (and Baroness 
Chalker) over the past year and was of course reiterated in 
the Queen's Speech at the opening of this Parliament. 
Indonesia's decision to replace IGGI and dismiss the 
Dutch was also in defiance of the position adopted by the 
Council of Ministers of the European Community on 28 
November 1991 "to explicitly introduce the consideration of 
human rights as an element of their relations with 
developing countries". 
We propose that Her Majesty's Government make known 
its dissatisfaction with the commission of inquiry set up by 
the Indonesian Government and the savage sentences passed 
on survivors of the November 12 massacre. We hope that 
the Government will make it plain that British aid to 
Indonesia cannot continue unless aJJ East Timorese held and 
tried in the wake of the massacre are released and the 
bodies of all those who died in the massacre are returned to 
their families. There should also be a proper investigation 
to establish who in the upper echelons of the army was 
responsible for the massacre. HMG should signal that 
giving sentences of a few months each to a handful of Jow-
ranking soldiers is unacceptable in response to the call by 
the international community for those in the armed forces 
responsible for murder to be brought to justice. 
Finally, we urge Her Majesty's Government to press for 
the immediate publication of the report of Amos Wako, the 
UN secretary general's special representative, of his visit to 
Dili in February this year. We believe the report should be 
made available to aU donor countries in advance of the July 
meeting of the CGI. 
Members of the House of Lords: 
Viscount Brentford (Conservative); Lord Avebury (Liberal 
Democrat); Lord Judd (Labour); Lord Rea (Lab); Lord 
Ennals (Lab); and Lord Hatch of Lusby {Lab) 
Members of the House of Commons: 
David Alton (Lib Dem. Mossley Hill); David Anderson 
{Lab. Swansea E.); Dale -Campbell-Savours (Lab. 
Workington); Ann Clwyd {Lab. Cynon Valley); Anthony 
Coombs (Con. Wyre Forest); George Foulkes (Lab.Co. 
Carrick, Cumnock & Doom Valley); Edward Garnier (Con. 
Harborough); Nick Harvey (Lib Dem. Devon N.); Jim 
Lester (Con. Broxtowe); Elizabeth Lynne (Lib Dem. 
Rochdale); Alice Mahon (Lab. Halifax); and David Trimble 
(Ulster Unionist). Jtl. 
Lord Avebury and Anthony Coombs MP, chair and secretary of the 
Parliamentary Human Rights Group, watching the COLD BLOOD 
film during the East 1imor hearing in Westminster 1".st December. 
They are both signatories of the ktter. 
16 TAPOL Bulletin No. 112, August 1992 
'LECTIONS 
Post-election politics 
The Indonesian elections can hardly be taken as a serious political indicator. At most, they have shown 
some trends. More important will be the presidential election next year and the post-election political 
atmosphere shows that many are gearing themselves for this event. 
As expected, Golkar, the ruling party lost some seats while 
the two others, the PD/ and PPP gained seats. Under 
proportional representation Golkar went down from 73.2% 
in 1987 to 68%. They lost 17 seats (16 to PD/ and one to 
PPP) and now have 282 seats. PPP rose from 15.9% to 
17% (62 seats) and PD/ from 10.7% to 15% (56 seats). 
The other hundred uncontested seats in parliament are 
reserved for ABRI (the Indonesian armed forces). 
Some conclusions 
For the fust time in fifteen years, Golkar lost votes but still 
has a huge majority. Past Golkar absolute majorities were 
ensured by full backing from the military. This is now 
shifting: important sections of the military have now taken 
a more neutral position while one small wing of retired 
officers openly joined the PD/. The election results are a 
result of these realignments . 
It should be stated over and over again that the three 
existing political groupings do not reflect the real political 
map of Indonesia. Golkar is the extension of the all-
pervasive government machinery while PPP and PD/ 
represent old political parties forcibly fused by the author-
ities. Golkar, previously set up by the military as an anti-
communist vehicle, has gradually turned into a huge mon-
strosity, arguably the most elaborate state apparatus. All 
ministers, the entire bureaucracy from top to bottom, as 
well as businessmen give allegiance to Golkar. It can be 
described as a super-ministry or like the communist party 
in former Eastern Europe countries - not to become a 
member can jeopardise your career. 
This explains why Golkar gets so many votes. So many 
voters are directly or indirectly economically dependent on 
Golkar. Moreover it is customary for Golkar to set targets; 
in every region or even polling booth, a certain percentage 
of votes is expected. If the target is not met, which hap-
pened in many places, the responsible person will face the 
consequences. A polling booth can be in a school, govern-
ment building or village where chiefs use aH their 'creativ-
ity' to achieve the target. This can result in anything from 
aggressive electioneering to straightforward cheating. Local 
military authorities often use heavy-handed methods to win 
Golkar votes, although this in decline. 
Golkar and the military 
Military backing for Golkar is eroding. ABRI's chief-of-
staff for social and political affairs, Lt.General Harsudiono 
Hartas now rejects the idea of coalition between Golkar and 
ABRI, which was consider quite natural in the seventies and 
eighties. He represents the main body of ABRI; others still 
see Golkar as a natural coalition partner. In particular many 
retired officers still regard Golkar as their lifeline. The 
structure of Golkar is geared towards this phenomenon, the 
Dewan Pembina (Board of Guidance) is fu]] of retired-
generals and is chaired by President Suharto himself. They 
include generals like Alamsyah, Panggabean, Supardjo 
Rustam and Rudini who have· political clout but are not 
close to Hartas, Edi Sudradjat and Sabala Rajagukguk. 
Hartas describes the present relationship between Golkar 
and ABRI as one of "mutual aspirations and concepts". 
Election fraud 
Intimidation, threats, tampering with poHing boxes is quite 
normal in elections but it would be wrong to describe this 
as the dominant factor, With targets set, it is up to local 
officials achieve them. The Indonesian media has reported 
several ugly incidents, most about tampering with votes. 
Al~hough vote counting should be witnessed by all parties, 
qmte often only Golkar was represented. Or, witnesses from 
PPP and PD/ were threatened or physically restrained 
which happened in many places in Aceh. In Lamceu, Aceh: 
villagers were flabbergasted when PPP, the Muslim feder-
ation, got only 3 votes while at least 100 villagers were 
ready to testify that they had voted for PPP. In Madura a 
local paramilitary was caught with nine Golkar votes in his 
pocket. He said he was acting on the order of the village 
head who, naturaHy, strongly denied it. 
A relatively new phenomena is election bribes. Empty 
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promises are standard all over the world but in Aceh, 
always a difficult place for Golkar, a lot of money was 
involved. Ret'd Major-General Bustanil Arifm, Minister of 
Cooperatives and married to Tien Suharto's younger sister, 
was sent to Aceh to campaign for Golkar. Every subdistrict 
chief received 500,000 rupiahs and every village-head 
100,000 rupiahs for a Golkar victory. Only · Golkar can 
shower regions with money; the other parties struggle along 
on shoestring budgets. 
Preparing for the presidential election 
Although Suharto has not announced his candidacy, all 
signs are that he is preparing for another term. The Dili 
massacre, or more accurately, the international outcry, his 
damage-limitation efforts and the widening gap between 
him and the army top, has delayed his efforts for a sixth 
term. Only now, after the elections, is he winning new 
loyalties and making realignments. Suharto has stepped into 
a new alignment with some Muslims, now under the 
umbrella of ICM/, the Indonesian Union of Muslim Intel-
lectuals. It is chaired by B.J.Habibie, the Minister of Tech-
nology, who is now being tipped as Suharto's likely choice 
for vice-president. General Try Sutrisno, ABRfs number 
one, is out of favour and is likely to be shunted off some-
where as an ambassador. 
Another delicate matter is how Suharto will reshuffle the 
army general staff. Although as president, he is also Pangti 
(Panglima Tertinggi, Supreme Commander) and appoints 
and replaces generals, he must tread carefully with ABRfs 
top brass. The present ABRI leadership is increasingly at 
loggerheads with Suharto and in the coming months, 
Suharto will have to take decisions about replacing gen-
erals. At present, there is a bottleneck; the present leader-
ship has been due for change since last year but remain in 
their positions because they disapprove of Suharto's choice 
for the ABRI leadership. The present chief-of-staff of the 
air force was Suharto's personal pilot. General Kunarto, the 
present fiigh-profile police chief was Suharto's aide for 
many years. The Cilangkap (ABRI HQ) general staff will all 
have to move on in the coming weeks and months, some 
promoted to more powerful posts, others kicked upstairs. 
General Edi Sudradjat is tipped to replace General Try 
Sutrisno as commander-in-chief while Lt. -General Sabala 
Rajagukguk, the present army deputy chief-of-staff, is 
expected to disappear into obscurity. 
The Indonesian media has mentioned the name of Lt.Gen-
eral Feisal Tanjung as new army chief-of-staff while 
Major-General Wismoyo (married to anot~er of Tien 
Suharto's sisters) is tipped to become deputy ch1ef-of-s~. 
Both are Suharto loyalists. Tanjung performed the daunt1!1g 
task of chairing the DKM Commission w~ich le.d to the trial 
and discharge of some soldiers in connection with the Santa 
Cruz massacre. 
Another controversial appointment will be the replacement 
of Ret'd Lt.General Ali Said as chair of the Supreme Court. 
The president wants to appoint ret'd Major-~eneral Dj~e­
lani, who chaired the KPN, the National Inqurry Commis-
sion while others not least Ali Said himself, say that 
' , . 
Djaelani is not senior enough for the job. It may be impos-
sible for Suharto to get his way in this particular case. 
These are hectic times for political analysts in Jakarta and 
the air is thick with rumours and speculations. lf 
A PDI rally in Jakarta. 3 million people altended the rally but, 
strange to say, the PDI lost seats in Jakarta. 
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More heavy sentences in Aceh 
Subversion trials in Aceh are a continuing saga. People from all layers of society, peasants, 
intellectuals, members of the armed forces and government officials, have been put on trial for their 
alleged involvement in Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, the Aceh Liberation Front. 
It is not easy to give a detailed account of the trials as 
reporting in the Indonesian press is fragmentary. At least 40 
trial8 have been conducted in various district courts in 
Aceh, no fewer than 10 in Medan. As in East Timor, the 
central government is devoting much attention to Aceh. 
Governor Ibrahim Hassan brags that Aceh will receive 575 
billion rupiahs (about US$ 275 million), for its 1992/1993 
budget, the highest anocation for any p.rovince outside Java. 
It has been a matter of prestige for GOLKAR to be sure of 
electoral victory in Aceh. After a series of defeats against 
the nominany Muslim federation PPP, Golkar managed to 
wrest a slight victory over PPP in 1987. This was achieved 
with bribes, intimidation, torture and fraud with the banot 
boxes. The 1992 elections were a repetition of 1987; most 
complaints of fraud were from there. 
As for security and order, there are conflicting accounts. 
Colonel Syarwan Hamid from the district military com-
mand, KOREM 011/Lilawangsa claims that the capture and 
killing of GAM leaders like Tengku Yusuf Ali has driven 
GAM onto the defensive. The entire eastern coast is heavily 
patrolled and illegal traffic with Malaysia is no longer 
possible. On the other hand, army chief-of-staff General 
Edi Sudradjat has admitted that 'remaining militant separa-
tists' are standing in the way of economic development and 
must be wiped out, in West Papua and East Timor as wen 
as in Aceh. Many thousands of crack troops have been sent 
to Aceh since 1989 imposing a heavy burden on the 
military budget. 
The trials 
Given the range of people put on trial, it can be concluded 
that GAM sympathies are to be found at an layers of 
society. In June, 4 members of ABRI were tried for subver-
sion. The military court in Banda Aceh doled out three 
sentences of 11 years to Police Sergeant M. Y acob, 27, 
First Lieutenant Aide Ida, 50, and Sergeant Idris Achmad, 
49. The charges were: involvement in GAM, attending 
meetings and circulating illegal pamphlets. Head Sergeant 
Maju Ali Siagian, 49, got 14 years for aneged support for 
GAM rebels. As commander of the Geumpang military sub-
district, he concluded a cease-fire agreement with the local 
GAM leadership. The verdict said that the cease-fue had 
strengthened GAM's position in the region. 
Two academics were also tried in Banda Aceh, Drs. 
Abdullah Husen, 47, who was charged with being a 
member of GAM and organising meetings at his office. The 
authorities found a photo of Tengku Hasan di Tiro, the 
leader of the movement, in his office. He was sentenced to 
6 years. Drs. Muhammad Gade Salam, 35, who anegedly 
attended meetings at Husen's office, was sentenced to 4 
years. 
In smaner places, district courts have also been busy with 
subversion cases. Two people were tried in the Sigli district 
court, Tarmizi bin Abdurrachman, 29, a peasant, and U 
bin U (initials only), 36, village head of Seunong. Charges: 
burning down the Jabal Gafur University campus and two 
schools. They were said to be long-time GAM members 
supplying the movement with money and food. The 
prosecution has demanded a 16-year sentence. 
In Lhok Seumawe Idris bin Ali (aka Nekrih), 52, 
received 17 years because in 1990 he, together with others, 
attacked the pulp-and-paper factory PT KKA in Krueng. 
Several soldiers were hurt and Private First Class Ismael 
was mortany wounded. The defendant has been a GAM 
member since 1988. 
Sulaiman bin Mahmud, 54, was tried in Idi, East Aceh. 
Allegedly the local Panglima (commander) of GAM, he was 
accu8ed of killing Head Sergeant Trimin in 1989. He 
hoisted the GAM flag several times above official buildings. 
Sulaiman received a sentence of ten years. 
In May, the chief prosecutor, Soesandi announced that 
Ibrahim Ligadinsyah, 29, would go on trial in Takengon. 
The defendant is a well-known activist and allegedly an 
expert in explosives. He received military training in Libya 
in 1988. Nothing is yet known about his trial. 
In the district court of Medan, North Sumatra, Syaiful 
Bachri, 31, was sentenced to 12 years, charged with GAM 
membership, possessing weapons, armed robbery and giving 
money to the movement. * 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 112, August 1992 19 
;. .- -.:. 
Earl~ May it was announced by the Chief of the Prosecu-
tion Soesandi that Ibrahim Ligadinsyah (29 yrs) will be 
taken to trial in Takengon. The defendant ·is a wellknown 
activist and allegedly an expert in explosives. He received 
Continued from front page 
Indonesian workers seeking jobs across the waters are 
concerned, the operation will provide the cover for the 
deportation of hundreds of Acehnese in Malaysia who fear 
that the Indonesian authorities. have been spying on them 
and are determined to get their hands on all those regarded 
as supportive of the Aceh Merdeka movement. 
On 22 June, TAPOL faxed an urgent appeal to Mr Stan 
Bronee at the UNHCR Kuala Lumpur office, asking him, 
under no circumstances to oust the Acehnese until they 
have been given refugee status. He was asked for an 
assurance that all Acehnese in Malaysia who wish to claim 
refugee status will be interviewed without delay, to prevent 
forcible repatriation and to hold talks with the Malaysian 
government to grant them asylum or collaborate with the 
UNHCR in seeking third country refuge. 
Three weeks later, it was learnt that the UNHCR had 
started issuing Refugee Identity Cards to the 43. But they 
were told that the UNHCR could give no guarantee that the 
Malaysian authorities would recognise this and they could 
still face arrest and deportation if they leave the compound. 
In Aceh itself, troops have engaged in a violent 
crackdown; at least two thousand are thought to have been 
killed in the past two years. 
Malaysian collusion 
The Malaysian government is collaborating closely with the 
Indonesians in this human tragedy. Although Malaysia is 
not a signatory of the 1958 Convention on Refugees, it is 
bound by international law not to return people against their 
will to a country where they have reasonable grounds for 
fearing human rights abuses; 
Malaysian collusion started when the authorities rounded 
up Acehnese boat-people who fled to Malaysia last year, 
held them in lock-ups and refused access to the UNHCR 
whose task it is to investigate the wishes of people asking 
for asylum and determine their eligibility for refugee status. 
Still worse, Indonesian consular officials were given 
exclusive access to the detainees, even to the exclusion of 
military training in Libya in 1988. Nothing yet is known 
about his trial. 
In the District Court of Medan, North Sumatra, Syaiful 
Bachri (31 yrs) was sentenced to 12 years with the charges 
of GAM membership, possessing weapons, armed robbery 
and giving money to the movement. * 
relatives and friends, enabling them to exert pressure on the 
Acehnese to return home. Already several hundred have 
succumbed and returned home, only to face arrest and in 
some cases, death. 
Already several hundred Acehnese boat-people who fled 
from villages at the centre of the crackdown have been 
refouled. On 19 July, it was learnt that 62 Acehnese in Juru 
jail who have resisted all enticements to return home were 
moved without notice to join groups of recently arrested 
'illegal economic immigrants' who are being readied for 
repatriation. TAPOL immediately wrote to the Malaysian 
government warning that it would hold them responsible if 
these refugees are returned to Aceh. 
One former detainee in Juru prison, Getjhik Hamid, an 
elderly village chief who was used by Indonesian consular 
officials to persuade others to return with him, has now 
'disappeared' and there are grave fears for his safety. J} 
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More financial backing for Suharto 
Indonesia~ financial backers have agreed to give the Suharto regime more in economic aid than ever 
before, more even than Indonesia was asking. While demonstrators from many European countries 
protested on the streets, inside the con/ erence hall the Dili massacre, the East Timorese, the Acehnese, 
the West Papuans and all of Jakarta~ victims were quietly forgotten. Suharto had done enough damage 
limitation after Santa Cruz to get business back to normal. 
US$200 million more 
The Consultative Group on Indonesia, Indonesia's new aid 
consortium with the World Bank presiding, met in Paris on 
16-17 July and pledged US$4.94 billion for 1992-93, 
US$200 million more than last year. Several countries and 
agencies have not yet announced their pledges so the total 
will probably exceed US$5 billion. 
Despite intense lobbying in many countries, by parlia-
mentarians, solidarity groups and human rights 
organisations including Asia Watch and Amnesty Interna-
tional (which published a 21-page document, Indo-
nesia/East Timor: The Suppression of Dissent three days 
before the meeting}, human rights was not allowed to stand 
in the way of world financial backing for Suharto. The only 
delegation to formally raise human rights concerns in the 
meeting itself was the US delegation which read out a 
statement of concern about the trials and gross discrep-
ancies between civil and military verdicts and about the 
failure of Jakarta to account for the dead and missing after 
the massacre. This was done solely because of pressure 
from the US Congress. Otherwise, human rights concerns 
were confined 'to the corridors'. 
As for the European Community which was attending the 
donors' meeting for the first time, there had been intense 
pressure for a joint statement on human rights. However, 
the UK made sure this was done privately with the 
Indonesian Minister, Radius Prawiro. Radius responded by 
expressing gratitude to the British envoy for having raised 
the matter so discreetly. 
Expanded donors' group 
The CGI, created in the wake of Indonesia's rebuke of the 
Netherlands, functions in the same way as the defunct 
IGGI. The Netherlands is no longer a member but five new 
members have been roped in: South Korea, the Kuwait 
Fund for Arab Economic Development, the Saudi Fund for 
Development, the Nordic Investment Bank and the Islamic 
Development Bank. 
To repair the damage in its relations with Indonesia, 
Dutch Foreign Minister van den Broek visited Jakarta just 
before the CGI meeting. Prime Minister Lubbers even took 
the extraordinary step of going especially to Paris on 16 
July to pay his respects to Radius Prawiro. Such are the 
lengths to which Dutch ministers will go to ingratiate 
themselves with Suharto. 
Jakarta's dependency on foreign aid 
While foreign governments have been willing to go on 
increasing their collective financial backing, there is deep 
concern in Indonesia that the country's foreign debt is 
reaching unmanageable proportions. Indonesia's total 
foreign debt now stands at US$78 billion, the Debt Service 
Ratio (the proportion of export earnings used for debt 
repayment and interest) will soon exceed 30 per cent. 
Almost half of Indonesia's routine budget expenditure goes 
to the repayment of foreign debt. · 
There was a US$4.5 billion deficit in Indonesia's balance 
of payments last year and no prospects that things will 
improve this year. As a result of falling earnings from oil 
and gas exports, foreign exchange from this sector, which 
accounts for 37 per cent of export earnings, is likely to fall 
by $1.7 billion. On the import side of the balance sheet, a 
year ago, Jakarta announced the postponement of all so-
called mega-projects because they impose such a heavy 
burden on the balance of payments. Yet one of the projects, 
the Chandra Asri poly-olefin project, a business venture of 
Barito Pasifik run by Prayogo Pangestu, and Bimantara, the 
business house of Bambang Suharto, was suddenly allowed 
to resume operations. It is developments like this that create 
tensions not only in Indonesia but at the World Bank and 
among Indonesia's financiers.. 
Because of the severe strains on Indonesia's current 
account, the CGI agreed to give $1.05 billion of this year's 
money in the form of fast-disbursing assistance to cope 
with Indonesia's foreign exchange crisis. In effect, the CGI 
is helping to finance the businesses of the Suharto clique:tt 
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WESTPARUA 
New initiatives for West Papuan independence 
New initiatives on behalf of West Papua in the South Pacific and in Sweden could get the issue onto 
the international agenda. 
Mawen calls for recognition 
Bernard Mawen, southern commander of the OPM, called 
on members of the South Pacific Forum not to forget the 
struggles of the West Papuan Melanesians. The plea came 
as members met in the Solomon Islands in July. 
Highlighting Australia's economic and military power in 
the region, Mawen asked the country to "do something 
positive" for West Papuan independence. Instead of con-
centrating on the problems of Cambodia and South Africa, 
be called on Gareth Evans, Australian Foreign Minister, to 
"look also at the freeing of the Melanesians of Irian Jaya 
from Indonesian bondage." The West Papuans are on 
Australia's doorstep, he added [PNG Times, 9.VII.92]. An 
OPM representative, Otto Ondowame, was in Australia to 
lobby political parties and the government to get West 
Papua on the parliamentary agenda [PNG Times, 2.VII.92). 
Dismissing the outcome of the 1969 Act of Free Choice 
as unjustified and undemocratic, he said his people have 
been denied their right to determine their poJitical destiny 
without fear and oppression. 
In response to a PNG school teacher's comment about the 
safety of PNG children along the border, Mawen gave his 
assurance that it is the OPM's policy not to harm or 
interrupt the Jives of PNG citizens [PNG Times, 9.VII.92]. 
Sweden presses for West Papuan solution 
Although the death of Swedish film-maker, Per-Ove 
Carlsson remains a mystery (see opposite), the cause he 
wanted to document has received more exposure in recent 
months.• Initiatives supporting self-determination for the 
West Papuan people have been taken in Sweden. 
The Swedish Social Democratic Party has urged parlia-
ment to recognise the OPM as the legitimate representative 
of the West Papuan people, give humanitarian aid to West 
Papuan refugees in Papua New Guinea and press the United 
Nations to pass a similar resolution to that of the Council 
of Europe on East Timor. 
Given that Sweden has given refuge to several OPM 
members in exile, who in February set up a West Papuan 
consulate in Malmo, Sweden is already one of the more 
sympathetic European countries to the cause of the Free 
Papua Movement. In addition, it has called on European 
Community countries to: 
* insist on a political solution negotiated under United 
Nations auspices, involving Indonesia and the West 
Papuans; 
* press for an end to all violations of human rights and 
the appropriation of West Papua's resources and assets; 
* support food and health aid to the West Papuans; and 
* implement an arms embargo on Indonesia until these 
objectives are achieved. 
More trials in West Papua 
The district court in Jayapura has tried two more men for 
sending supplies to the OPM. Both appear to have been 
involved in the network which Theo Rumkabu, charged in 
April, had apparently coordinated. Although Rumkabu was 
charged with subversion in April, no reports have yet been 
received of his sentence. 
Y eheskiel Patai, a local government official, was found 
guilty in June of supplying food and ammunition to the 
OPM, Kompas said. He started in 1987 when a friend 
introduced him to Marthen Prawar, the northern commander 
of the OPM. 
More than 70 Papuon political prisoners have been deported to 
prisons in Java. Lambertus Wellyb (left) and Saul Bomai (right) in 
Kalisosok prison, Surabaya. 
'J!1e seco~d m:m, named only as GP, 51, has pleaded 
guilty. He is said to have received a letter from Sonny 
Seseray, an O~M leader, asking him to send various goods. 
'J'.hrough Pata1, GP apparently then sent lubricating oil, 
cigarettes, sugar, coffee, facial powder and eucalyptus oil to 
guerrillas hiding in Boda village on the border with PNG. 
He could not respond to a second request from Seseray for 
lack of cash. The prosecution has asked the court to 
senten~ ~p to six years [Jakarta Post, 27.6.92]. 
The tmung of these trials, coinciding with the killing of 
Marthen Prawar, suggests that interrogation of the defend-
ants may have helped the intelligence discover the where-
abouts of Prawar. * 
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Swedish film-maker's murder unresolved 
At first, local police said it was suicide. PNG officials now admit the death is suspicious. Police 
investigations, however, have yet to come up with any explanation of how a Swedish film-maker came 
to have his throat slit on the morning of April 29 1992 in Kiunga, Papua New Guinea. 
Per-Ove Carlsson, a 36 year-old Gothlander from Sweden, 
had gone to Papua New Guinea in February after six 
months of research intending to make a documentary about 
the independence struggle of the OPM, whose operations 
are most prominent along West Papua's borders with PNG. 
Throughout his visit, Carlsson was in telephone contact 
with his long-time colleague, journalist Mats Brolin, 
including a call just the day before he died. 
It was on 6 March, from Garoka in the PNG highlands, 
that the film-maker had first phoned Brolin to say he 
thought he was being followed. But not until 23 April, from 
Daro in the southwest, did he tell Brolin that he had made 
contact with the OPM. Whether Carlsson actually went into 
West Papua to film the OPM is not clear, but it is known 
that some time over the next few days he visited the East 
Awin refugee camp at Kiunga. Here he interviewed and 
filmed OPM supporters. Here also, he may have been 
watched by less sympathetic observers. 
When he next phoned Brolin, he spoke carefully, letting 
him know that he thought the call was being tapped. He 
was still being watched, he said. 
The following morning, on 29 April, Carlsson's host, a 
school teacher from the local mission, found him dead with 
a 14-inch slit across his throat. Carlsson had appeared 
nervous the previous evening, according to the teacher, who 
had seen the Swede alive for the last time at 3am. In the 
morning, the teacher said he had saw blood seeping from 
under his door, which was locked from the inside. Since 
the window to the room was two-and-a-half metres off the 
ground, and nothing seemed to be missing from Carlsson's 
belongings, he assumed that no one had entered the room 
and that Per Ove Carlsson must have committed suicide. 
Suicide claim disavowed 
The local police first concluded that Carlsson must have 
taken his own life. But it was a week before the Swedish 
honorary consul was informed, or officials from Port 
Moresby visited the scene, by which time the area had been 
washed down. The PNG police have since amended the 
original finding as a 'misunderstanding', and are treating 
Carlsson's death as suspicious. The weapon used to cut 
Carlsson's throat, they said, was the saw blade of his Swiss 
Army knife. Strangely, the Swedish authorities, after their 
own autopsy, judged the cause of Carlsson's death to be 
'probably suicide'. Apparently it is possible to make a deep 
14-inch cut in one's own throat with a saw blade .... 
Mats Brolin and Carlsson's family are convinced that he 
was murdered. "You don't travel 20,000 kms and almost 
finish your work only to kill yourself," said his brother 
Paul. "He would never take his life. He was a cheerful 
man." 
Carlsson was dealing with highly sensitive material. What 
confirms the family's suspicion is the disappearance of three 
important video tapes, which Carlsson said he was going to 
send out by courier, from his room on April 29, while his 
passport and credit cards were all in ord.er. The contents of 
the tapes, in the opinion of Brolin, may hold the key to his 
death. 
After seeming to drag their feet, the Swedish police have 
now started carrying ouj thorough investigations and may 
soon extend their inquiries to the location of the crime. 
In response to a suggestion on Radio Australia programme 
that the OPM may have been involved in Carlsson's death, 
Bernard Mawen, regional OPM commander, issued a 
statement saying that the OPM wekomes foreign journalists 
who come to document its struggle, but that it was not 
aware of Carlsson's identity and travel plans at the time of 
his death. 
In the light of Indonesia's embarrassment at Max Stahl's 
film of the Santa Cruz massacre, together with Indonesia's 
ever-closer relationship with PNG, speculation in all 
quarters has been rife as to the roles played by the two 
countries' inteJligence units. "It's not strange that he got 
murdered" said Jacob Prai, OPM leader now in Sweden. 
"He had information which was absolutely not allowed to 
get out." 
Carlsson was an experienced traveller, having made 
documentaries with Brolin in China, Tibet and sensitive 
parts of Africa. The Committee for the Protection of 
Journalists has written to the PNG government asking for 
a full and open investigation of Carlsson's death. [Sources: 
PNG Times and independent material. See also, TAPOL 
Bulletin 111]. * 
Per-Ove Carlsson in Kenya, 1990 
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More border incursions into PNG 
Following a string of OPM offensives earlier this year, the Indonesian security forces have been 
anxious to flush out OPM guerrilla groups operating near along the PNG border. The skirmishes have 
taken Indonesian troops into PNG territory. 
Fearful of increased OPM activity in the run-up to the June 
9 election, Indonesian troops stepped up their offensive at 
the end of May, carrying out two attacks in the northern 
section of the border with Papua New Guinea. 
In the first attack, Martin Prawar, military chief and 
northern commander of the OPM, was reportedly shot dead. 
Maj.Gen Abinowo, Commander of Indonesia's Trikora 
regional military command, said in a news conference that 
a special task force, whose orders were to capture Prawar, 
dead or alive, had raided an OPM base at Skouw on the 
border and shot Prawar dead. A coIJeague, Sulaeman Yefri, 
was captured in the raid, and arms, documents, radios and 
medicine was seized. Martin Prawar commanded the OPM 
division which was being supplied, according to recent 
trials, by Zeth Rumkabu and others (see TAPOL Bulletin 
111 and separate item in this issue]. 
The Indonesian government usually tries to play down the 
effectiveness of the OPM, claiming its members amount to 
only around 200. But Maj.Gen Abinowo admitted that the 
OPM group Prawar commanded was particularly feared 
because most of its members are army deserters with war 
strategy skills. "But with the raid, their base for operations 
in the northern part of the province has been destroyed" he 
said [Jakarta Post, 6.VI.92]. 
Clearly, however, ABRI is concerned about more than the 
Skouw base. On the same weekend, Indonesian troops 
crossed into PNG and attacked an OPM camp near Wutung. 
Having captured an OPM member out looking for food, 
they forced him to lead them to the OPM camp, according 
to reliable sources in Vanimo [Post-Courier, 3.VI.92]. On 
reaching the camp, 3km northwest of Wutung, Indonesian 
troops opened fire, wounding two men. After shooting their 
captive, they set fire to the camp and left him there. Other 
occupants fled, the sources say. Villagers discovered the 
two wounded men, Jason Malo and Carlos Kosama, and 
drove them to V animo Hospital 
While local Papuans have been left 'frightened and angry' 
by the attack, police in Vanimo are preparing charges 
against the wounded victims, a situation reminiscent of the 
Santa Cruz aftermath in East Timor. 
The PNG government has apparently raised no complaint 
at the border incursion, exposing the reality of intentions of 
the January Status of Forces agreement with Indonesia. It 
has, however, stationed PNG Defence Force (PNGDF) 
troops in the area. But while a PNGDF officer confirmed 
the incursion, in Jakarta armed forces spokesman Brig.Gen 
Nurhadi Purwosaputro strongly denied it. "Its not true. 
None of our members crossed the Rl-PNG border." 
Several times since the agreement was signed in January, 
Indonesian officials have said that ABRI troops are 
prohibited from crossing into PNG [eg, Antara 9.IV.92.]. 
That the incursion was denied only brings into question 
the role of the Indonesian soldiers deployed in a civic 
action programme announced in May. Troops will build a 
water supply system at Bena, as the first example of the 
civic cooperation agreed in January under the Status of 
Forces agreement. Some PNG citizens are evidently not 
enamoured with the programme. "How stupid can you get?" 
asked Johnson Farekoi in a letter to the PNG Times on 28 
May. The Defence Minister is inviting Indonesia to spy on 
PNG "to get ready when they take over", he wrote. 
Indonesian 'fishing vessels' 
Soon after the border incursion, coastal villagers in PNG 
were disturbed · to discover that two fishing vessels sighted 
near the coast were Indonesian, not Taiwanese as originally 
thought. PNG's intelligence service, NIO, confirmed that 
vessels belonging to the Indonesians were hired to fish 
between the mouth of the Sepik river and the border village 
of Wutung under an arrangement between the government 
and East Sepik businessman Daniel Takendu. Villagers have 
live in fear since the incursion and unusual sightings of the 
vessels have further intensified an already tense situation. 
A village spokesman visited the vessel to meet its crew 
and was suspicious that two of them were active members 
in the Indonesian military. He has called on the NIO to 
immediately halt the operations of the two vessels. [PNG 
Times, 26-06-1992] 1' 
Books Received 
The following will be reviewed in Bulletin 113: 
East Timor: Indonesian Occupation and Genocide by A. 
Barbedo de Magalhaes [Oporto University, 1992] 
East Timor: A Western Made Tragedy by Mark Aarons and 
Robert Domm, [The Left Book Club, 1992) 
Timor's Anschluss: Indonesian and Australian Policy in 
East Timor 1974-76 by Sue Rabitt Roff (The Edwin 
Mellen Press, 1992] 
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